Citation: (2024) 10 NWLR [PT. 1947] AT 485.
Courtesy: Moruff O. Balogun, FIMC, CMC, CMS
Summary of Facts
Sometimes in 1986, the respondent got married to the appellant under the Kwalla native law and custom. In 1988, the respondent purchased a piece of land situate at 52/1972, C/o Turaki ward, from one Jatau Kwangdur. The transaction was noted in a written agreement which reflected the name of the respondent and witnessed by Tongmark Job and Damoeorem Danyil.
When the respondent returned home after the purchase, he showed his wife, the appellant the written agreement. The appellant protested that the agreement ought to reflect her name instead of the respondent since she raised the funds for the purchase.
However, according to her being an obedient wife she did not pursue her objection over the documentation any further. The property was further developed and the appellant and respondent cohabited thereat and gave birth to their children at the premises.
Their marital relationship, regrettably, degenerated to the extent that on the 20th May, 2013 their marital union was dissolved by the Area Court Grade 1, Sendam.
Shortly after, specifically in October, 2013, the respondent instituted Suit PLD/5/49/2013 at the High Court of Plateau State against the appellant wherein he sought for the following reliefs as plaintiff:
“A declaration that the plaintiff is the owner and is entitled to the right of occupancy of all the piece of land measuring 90 x 77 x 90 x77 situate in Shendam and more particularly known as No. 52/1972 C/o Turaki Ward Shendam (hereinafter called the land in dispute).
A declaration that the continuous stay on the said land in dispute by the defendant constitutes trespass.
An order of perpetual injunction against the defendant from further trespassing on the land in dispute.
An order for the payment of N1, 000,000.00 as damage for trespass.
Cost of this action”.
In reaction to the respondent’s claim, the appellant vehemently joined issues with the respondent in her statement of defence. She also filed a counter claim wherein she also claimed for a declaration of ownership of No. 52/1972 C/o 52/1972 C/o Turaki ward Shendam contending that she gave her money to the respondent to purchase the land on her behalf.
Appellant maintained that the respondent was jobless at the time of the purchase, consequently he lacked the financial capabilities to acquire the land. Appellant further asserted that she had a thriving fashion design enterprise with employees working for her at that time of the purchase of the land in dispute. The appellant sought the following reliefs against the respondent in her counter claim:
“N1,000,000.00 general damages for trespass.
A declaration that the counter claimant is the owner of that property lying and situate at No. 52 Turaki ward of Shendanm Local Government Area, having purchased same in 1988.
An order of perpetual injunction restraining the defendant from trespassing and/or further acts of trespass on the property lying and situate at No. 52/1972 C/o Turaki Ward Shendam Local Government Area.
Cost of this action”.
The respondent subsequently, filed a defence to the counter claim wherein he likewise joined issues with the appellant. Respondent maintained that the appellant never gave him money to purchase the land in dispute, rather he had been a successful mechanized farmer for several years prior to his marital union with the appellant.
He claimed that he purchased and subsequently developed the land in dispute from proceeds of his successful mechanized farming and personal savings earned from his monthly wages as a civil servant. Respondent further asserted that, to date he has been solely funding the upkeep of his family as well as footing his children’s education.
The appellant subsequently filed an amended statement of defence dated 28th October, 2015.
The appellant further joined issues with the respondent, where, she disclosed that she was constrained to raise money for her children’s school fees from relations and it was courtesy of her good will that she secured a job for the respondent as a messenger in November, 1988, prior to the employment, appellant asserted that the respondent was jobless.
At trial, both parties testified personally. In all, four witnesses testified for the respondent whilst eight witnesses testified for the appellant. Both parties respectively tendered documents which were admitted at trial.
At the conclusion of the trial, both parties counsel filed and exchanged final written addresses.
On the 18th May, 2018, the trial court delivered judgment. In a considered judgment, the trial court entered judgment in favour of the respondent by granting four of the reliefs sought by the respondent and partially awarded damages in the sum of N20, 000.00 in favour of the respondent in respect of the fourth relief. The trial court consequently dismissed the appellant’s counter claim.
Aggrieved by the decision of the trial court the appellant appealed to the Court of Appeal.
Held: (Unanimously dismissing the appeal)
Whether document pleaded for a particular purpose can be considered for other purposes not pleaded –
If a document is pleaded, it must be for a particular purpose. As such, a document pleaded as transferring interest in land to a party cannot be considered for other purposes not pleaded. In the instant case, going by the respondent’s assertion in paragraph 5 of the statement of claim and the purport of exhibit B, the Court of Appeal was unable to hold that Mr. Jatau Kwangdur had conferred, transferred, limited, charged or extinguished his interest in No. 52/1972 C/o Turaki Ward Shendam in favour of the respondent.
This apart, paragraph 5 was merely an assertion by the respondent that he bought the land in dispute from Mr. Jatau Kwangdur. Putting it another way, exhibit B was evidence of an agreement by Mr. Jatau Kwangdur to sell his property to the respondent in the sum of N1,500.
It did not confer title neither did it extinguish Mr. Jatau Kwangdur’s legal interest (if any) in favour of the respondent. This being the case, exhibit B could be pleaded and admitted in evidence to establish the fact that Mr. Jatau Kwangdur had agreed to sell Plot 52/1972 to the respondent.
Exhibit B was certainly not a registrable instrument. Thus, exhibit B did not offend sections 2 and 15 of the Land Registration Law of Northern Nigeria considering that it did not confer any legal interest in favour of the respondent.
Exhibit B was not a registrable instrument and could not be used to prove title. Therefore, the trial court rightly admitted it in evidence since it was not a registrable instrument.
What court will consider in admitting or rejecting an unregistered instrument –
When a court is determining whether or not to admit or reject an unregistered instrument, it has to consider the purpose and the use to which it is being put. In the vocabulary of pleadings, the pleader has a duty to show that the document was pleaded as an acknowledgement of payment and not as an instrument of title.
Onus on plaintiff in action for declaration of title to land where title of grantor is in issue –
A declaratory relief must be strictly proved. Where the title of a grantor is in issue, production of document of title without more is not sufficient proof of title to land. In such a situation, it is the duty of the claimant to go further to not only plead and trace the root of title of the grantor or vendor but prove same on the balance of probability. Where the claimant fails to discharge this onus his claim must fail.
In the instant case, the respondent failed to establish ownership of the land in dispute vide exhibit B. Exhibit B did not confer any legal interest or title in favour of the respondent. That being the case, the trial court erred in law when it held that the respondent had proved his case against the appellant. In the circumstance, the first leg of the respondent’s relief for an order of declaration of ownership failed.
Whether mere production of title documents sufficient to prove title to land –
The mere production of title document(s) is only a presumption, for there are certain tests that any document relied on as proof of title to land must
satisfy. They are as follows:
- Whether the document is genuine and valid.
- Whether it has been duly executed, stamped and registered.
- Whether the grantor had the authority and capacity to make the grant.
- Whether in fact the grantor has what he purported to grant and
- Whether it has the effect claimed by the holder of the instrument.
In the instant case, the decision of the trial court on the first leg of the respondent’s relief failed.
Accordingly, the trial court’s order that the respondent had proved his case of ownership against the appellant was set aside.
On essence of address of counsel and need to be based on facts proven by evidence before the court –
Allegations of events in the address of counsel are not valid for consideration. Address of counsel on factual issues must be based on the facts proven by evidence contained in the record before the court.
Counsel cannot while addressing the court allege facts not contained in the evidence before the court and address the court on the basis of such unproven allegation of facts. Any argument on the basis of such unproven allegation of fact is clearly speculative and baseless.
In the instant case, the trial court erred in law in its decision that the respondent had proved his case against the appellant on the basis of exhibit B, whereas, the sole purpose of exhibit B was for proof by respondent of his payment for land in dispute.
The primary relief sought by respondent was a declaratory right of ownership of the land in dispute. Respondent can only succeed in proving his right to title upon the presentation of a valid grant conferring him with legal interest.
The latter day allegation by the respondent’s counsel in the respondent’s brief of argument that a relief for an equitable title was sought by the respondent vide his pleadings was totally lacking in basis and merit. His submission was therefore discountenanced by the court.
On Duty on party to relate documents he tendered to facts pleaded in support of the documents –
It is not within the province of a court of law to fill in the gaps for litigants neither can a judge act conjectures. A party presenting a document at trial must lead credible evidence to explain the purpose for tendering the document and establish through plausible evidence the nexus between the document tendered and facts pleaded in support of the document. W
Where there are no material facts in support of the document sought to be tendered in the pleadings the court must refrain from making a case for its presentation in evidence by surmising or filling in the gaps by conjecturing facts in support of the document.
In the instant case, the documents accompanying exhibit B and purportedly issued by the Shendam Local Administration and a receipt issued by the Shendam Native Authority in favour of Jatau Kwangdor respectively dated 1972 were neither pleaded nor was evidence led in their support.
Both documents were just dumped at trial by the respondent without any pleadings of facts in their support of both documents. No evidence was elicited by the respondent to link both documents with the respondent’s case. The essence of tendering the documents were not disclosed, and the trial court was thus, left to conjecture the objective behind their presentation at trial. Therefore, both documents ought to have been outrightly rejected discountenanced by the trial court.
On whether court can set up a case different from that put forward by a party –
A court of law cannot set up a case that is different from that put forward by a party in an action. In the instant case, the appellant raised the defence of resulting trust in her defence to the respondents claim. However, the trial Judge completely swerved off the bend in his finding that the appellant alleged breach of trust. The decision of the trial Judge was totally incongruous as it had no bearing whatsoever with the state of the appellant’s defence. There was nowhere in the appellant’s pleadings where breach of trust or fraud was alleged against the respondent.
This being the case, the trial court was wrong in its finding that the appellant alleged breach of trust. Notwithstanding that the trial court blundered in its findings that a case of breach of trust and fraud was canvassed by the appellant in her statement of defence, the trial court did not arrive at any consequential decision on his unfounded observation.
Aside from this, the remarks of the trial court was innocuous to the parties’ case, as it fell short of making any finding on breach of trust and or fraud allegedly pleaded by appellant. In other words, the trial Judge’s comments could as well be per incuriam, in so far as the remarks were made in passing without any attendant effect on the case before him.
Much as the trial court’s Judge conduct was berated by the Court of Appeal, a miscarriage of justice could not be said to have been occasioned to the appellant by the trial Judge’s unfounded allegations. Therefore, the appellant’s right to fair hearing was not breached by the learned trial Judge.
Courtesy:
MORUFF O. BALOGUN, FIMC, CMC, CMS
FORMER VICE CHAIRMAN, NBA IJEBU ODE BRANCH,
IJEBU ODE, OGUN STATE.
08052871414
09121207712 [WHATSAPP]