1. Introduction
A creditor owed money in Nigeria does not simply sue. The road from unpaid invoice to money in the bank runs through a demand letter, a limitation period, possibly an arbitration clause, a choice of procedure and, at the end, enforcement against assets that may by then have moved.
This article follows that road. It argues that Nigerian law gives creditors a workable set of remedies on paper, but that recovery is won or lost on sequencing and procedural discipline, and that two features of the system, the Attorney-General’s consent requirement for public funds and the delay built into ordinary trial, still limit what those remedies can deliver.
Debt lets individuals and organisations fund ventures by borrowing from a creditor on a promise to repay the principal, usually with interest, on an agreed date. In secured lending, the creditor also takes security over the debtor’s assets, such as land, shares or other property, and the security is released on full repayment.
Black’s Law Dictionary defines a debt as a specific sum of money due by agreement or otherwise.[1] The Court of Appeal adopted that approach in Ekaete v Union Bank of Nigeria Plc, treating a debt as a liability on a claim for a specific sum.[2]
Saying that one is owed money does not make it a recoverable debt. Three conditions must be met: the sum must be certain, it must be fixed or liquidated; the due date must have passed, or a demand must have been made where the debt is payable on demand; and the obligation must arise from an express or implied agreement.[3]
The first condition is the one that decides the choice of procedure later on. In Nigerian Postal Services v Insight Engineering Company Ltd (2006) 8 NWLR (Pt 983) 435, the Court of Appeal considered the distinction between a claim for a debt or liquidated money demand and other claims in the context of the undefended list procedure.
A liquidated demand is a specific sum due and payable whose amount is ascertained or ascertainable by arithmetic without further investigation, distinguishing it from unliquidated damages, which require judicial assessment.[4] The Supreme Court has also accepted that an unpaid balance of an agreed principal sum is a debt.[5]
Where a debt is payable on a fixed date, the cause of action accrues on that date. Where it is payable on demand, or the contract is silent, the cause of action accrues only when the creditor makes a demand, and the debtor fails to pay. The Court of Appeal put this plainly in Kolo v First Bank of Nigeria Plc, which also concerned an overdraft: without a demand, no cause of action has arisen.[6]
Coscharis Beverages Ltd v ITF is to the same effect: the passage of time alone does not set the machinery of the law in motion, and a claim brought without a prior demand risks failing.[7]
An action must then be started within time. For simple contract debts the period is generally six years under the state Limitation Laws, and a claim brought outside it is statute-barred.[8] A written acknowledgement of the debt, or a part-payment, can start time running again, but that rule comes from the Limitation Law itself.
A creditor who delays the demand also delays the start of the limitation period. The protection for debtors lies in other place such as a debtor’s silence in the face of a demand or statement of account for an unreasonable time can support an inference that the debt is admitted,[9] and the court’s power to treat very stale claims with suspicion.
The practical lesson for creditors is to send a clear written demand early, keep proof of service, and diarise the limitation date from the day the debt falls due.
Before issuing proceedings, the creditor must check the contract. Where it contains a valid arbitration or ADR clause, that process ordinarily has to be exhausted first, and a court may stay proceedings brought in breach of it.[10]
A creditor who ignores the clause risks months lost on a stay application, which matters when limitation is running. The clause also affects strategy: arbitration may be quicker and more private, but it offers no interim asset-freezing power that binds third parties, so a creditor worried about dissipation may still need to go to court for interim relief.
2. Summary judgment and the undefended list
Summary judgment disposes quickly of cases that are virtually uncontested and gives judgment to the claimant without a full trial, as Obaseki-Adejumo JCA described it in Maduike v Tetelis Nigeria Ltd.[11]
In Lagos the procedure sits in Order 13 of the High Court of Lagos State (Civil Procedure) Rules 2019. The claimant files the writ with a motion on notice for summary judgment, an affidavit verifying the liquidated sum and the belief that the defendant has no defence, a written address and the supporting exhibits.[12]
The Supreme Court explained the purpose of the procedure in Macaulay v NAL Merchant Bank Ltd: it stops dishonest debtors from using technicalities to delay payment where the facts are not genuinely in dispute.[13]
The undefended list is the equivalent route in other jurisdictions. In the Federal Capital Territory it was under Order 35 of the 2018 Rules, and the 2025 Rules, if now in force, move it to Order 34.[14]
In comparison to English Common Law, Part 24 of the Civil Procedure Rules lets a court give judgment where the defendant has no real prospect of successfully defending the claim and there is no other compelling reason for a trial.[15] The Nigerian procedures share that aim but depend heavily on the quality of the supporting affidavit and on the court’s willingness to look past technical objections.
A creditor who files a thin affidavit, or whose sum is not clearly liquidated, will be sent to full trial and loses the speed that made the route attractive. The creditor’s real advantage comes from preparing the affidavit and exhibits properly, not from the choice of rule.
A creditor who fears that the debtor will move assets before judgment can apply for a Mareva injunction; an order restraining a defendant from removing assets from the jurisdiction or disposing of them.[16] The applicant must show a good arguable case, a real risk that assets will be dissipated, clear disclosure of all material facts, full particulars of the assets, a balance of convenience in the applicant’s favour and an undertaking in damages.[17] An order can bind third parties, including banks, and operates on the specified assets within the jurisdiction.
The remedy is strong but not cheap. The duty of full disclosure is strict, and an applicant who leaves out something risks having the order discharged. The undertaking in damages exposes the creditor to a claim if the claim later fails. For these reasons, a Mareva application is justified where there is evidence of an actual risk, such as a history of asset transfers, and not simply because the debtor is slow to pay.
3. Enforcement: garnishee proceedings and the writ of fi fa
Winning judgment is only half the task. Of the enforcement tools, garnishee proceedings are among the most effective, because they let a creditor attach money owed to the debtor by a third party, usually a bank where the debtor holds an account, and apply it to the debt. The procedure is governed mainly by the Sheriffs and Civil Process Act, together with the Judgments (Enforcement) Rules and the relevant High Court rules.[18]
The process has two stages. First the judgment creditor applies ex parte, supported by an affidavit stating the unsatisfied judgment, the sum due and the belief that the garnishee holds funds belonging to the debtor. If the court is satisfied, it makes an order nisi, which attaches the debt provisionally and requires the garnishee to appear and show cause why the order should not be made absolute.
At least fourteen days before the hearing, the order nisi must be served on the garnishee and the judgment debtor.[19] At the return date, if the garnishee does not dispute liability or shows no sufficient cause, the court may make the order absolute and direct payment to the creditor. Payment under an order absolute discharges the garnishee to the extent of the sum paid, and any private dealing with the attached debt after service of the order nisi is void.[20]
Where funds are held by a public officer, or are in the custody of the law, the consent of the Attorney-General is required before they can be attached.[21] The Supreme Court has treated that requirement as binding in Central Bank of Nigeria v Interstella Communications Ltd.[22].
For private creditors dealing with public bodies, this makes the contract terms, and the earlier decision whether to contract at all, more important than the enforcement stage. Courts have also stressed that the creditor must show due diligence that the funds actually exist with the garnishee before starting the process.
The writ of fieri facias, commonly called a fi fa, complements garnishee proceedings. It is issued under the Sheriffs and Civil Process Act and allows the Sheriff to seize and sell the judgment debtor’s movable property, and, with leave of court where required, immovable property, to satisfy the judgment debt.[23]
In Olatunji v Owena Bank Plc the Supreme Court held that the writ may issue immediately after judgment is pronounced, as a matter of course, without leave and without prior notice or service of the judgment on the debtor.[24] A creditor who lodges the writ promptly may reach assets before a debtor has time to react.
Debt recovery in Nigeria is strictly a civil matter. Section 32(2) of the Police Act 2020 forbids arresting a person merely for a civil wrong or breach of contract.[25] In Madaki v Guaranty Trust Bank Plc, the Court of Appeal condemned the practice of bringing the police into civil debt disputes and warned that creditors who do so risk liability for breach of fundamental rights and for malicious prosecution.[26]
Creditors are therefore expected to use the civil remedies discussed above: summary judgment, Mareva injunctions, garnishee proceedings and the writ of fi fa.
In conclusion, the remedies available to a Nigerian creditor are real and, for the most part, well developed. What decides outcomes is the order in which they are used. A creditor who checks the contract for an arbitration clause, serves a clear demand and keeps proof of it, issues within the limitation period, chooses a summary route with a properly built affidavit, seeks a Mareva order only where the risk of dissipation is evidenced, and moves quickly to enforce, has a good chance of recovery.
The areas that still need attention are the Attorney-General’s consent requirement against public debtors and the delay created when a claim is forced into full trial. Reform in those two areas would do more for creditors than any further expansion of the available remedies.
Bibliography
Cases
Attorney-General of Adamawa State v Attorney-General of the Federation (2014) LPELR-23221(SC)
Central Bank of Nigeria v Interstella Communications Ltd (2017) LPELR-43940(SC)
Coscharis Beverages Ltd v Industrial Training Fund (2021) LPELR-56849(CA)
Demrowl International Co Ltd v Guaranty Trust Bank Plc (2019) LPELR-48965(CA)
Ekaete v Union Bank of Nigeria Plc (2014) LPELR-23111(CA)
IFS v DSNL Offshore [citation to be added]
Iga v Amakiri (1976) 11 SC 1
Kolo v First Bank of Nigeria Plc (2002) LPELR-7106(CA); (2003) 3 NWLR (Pt 806) 216
Macaulay v NAL Merchant Bank Ltd (1990) 4 NWLR (Pt 144) 283 (SC)
Madaki v Guaranty Trust Bank Plc (2022) LPELR-57419(CA)
Maduike v Tetelis Nigeria Ltd (CA/L/339/10) [2015] NGCA 9 (1 February 2016)
Mareva Compania Naviera SA v International Bulkcarriers SA [1975] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 509 (CA)
Mekwunye v Lotus Capital Ltd (2018) JELR 38591(CA)
Nigerian Postal Service v Insight Engineering Co Ltd (2006) LPELR-8240(CA)
Olatunji v Owena Bank Plc (2008) 8 NWLR (Pt 1090) 668 (SC)
Sotuminu v Ocean Steamship (Nigeria) Ltd (1992) 5 NWLR (Pt 239) 1 (SC)
Legislation and rules
Arbitration and Mediation Act 2023
Civil Procedure Rules 1998 (SI 1998/3132)
High Court of the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja (Civil Procedure) Rules 2018
High Court of the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja (Civil Procedure) Rules 2025
High Court of Lagos State (Civil Procedure) Rules 2019
Limitation Law of Lagos State [add year]
Police Act 2020
Sheriffs and Civil Process Act, Cap S6, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 2004
Secondary sources
Garner BA (ed), Black’s Law Dictionary (11th edn, Thomson Reuters 2019)
Harlem Solicitors, ‘Debt Recovery in Nigeria: An Appraisal of Legal and Contemporary Strategies’ (October 2022) [add URL and date accessed] [Add books and journal articles here as they are found]
[1]Bryan A Garner (ed), Black’s Law Dictionary (11th edn, Thomson Reuters 2019) ‘debt’.
[2]Ekaete v Union Bank of Nigeria Plc (2014) LPELR-23111(CA).
[3]Ekaete (n 2).
[4]Nigerian Postal Service v Insight Engineering Co Ltd (2006) LPELR-8240(CA).
[5]Attorney-General of Adamawa State v Attorney-General of the Federation (2014) LPELR-23221(SC) [pinpoint and proposition to be verified].
[6]Kolo v First Bank of Nigeria Plc (2002) LPELR-7106(CA); (2003) 3 NWLR (Pt 806) 216
[7]Coscharis Beverages Ltd v Industrial Training Fund (2021) LPELR-56849(CA)
[8]Limitation Law of Lagos State, the draft cited s 20(1)(a),
[9]Demrowl International Co Ltd v Guaranty Trust Bank Plc (2019) LPELR-48965(CA), citing Iga v Amakiri (1976) 11 SC 1.
[10]Arbitration and Mediation Act 2023, s 5; Mekwunye v Lotus Capital Ltd (2018) JELR 38591(CA) [add LPELR or NWLR report].
[11]Maduike v Tetelis Nigeria Ltd (CA/L/339/10) [2015] NGCA 9 (1 February 2016) (Obaseki-Adejumo JCA).
[12]High Court of Lagos State (Civil Procedure) Rules 2019, Order 13.
[13]Macaulay v NAL Merchant Bank Ltd (1990) 4 NWLR (Pt 144) 283 (SC).
[14]High Court of the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja (Civil Procedure) Rules 2025, Order 34 [verify against the Rules themselves]; High Court of the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja (Civil Procedure) Rules 2018, Order 35.
[15]Civil Procedure Rules 1998 (SI 1998/3132) pt 24.
[16]Sotuminu v Ocean Steamship (Nigeria) Ltd (1992) 5 NWLR (Pt 239) 1 (SC); the doctrine comes from Mareva Compania Naviera SA v International Bulkcarriers SA [1975] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 509 (CA).
[17]IFS v DSNL Offshore [full citation to be added; none was given in the draft].
[18]Sheriffs and Civil Process Act, Cap S6, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 2004, ss 83–91.
[19]Sheriffs and Civil Process Act (n 20) s 83(2).
[20]Sheriffs and Civil Process Act (n 20) ss 91 and 92.
[21]Sheriffs and Civil Process Act (n 20) s 84.
[22]Central Bank of Nigeria v Interstella Communications Ltd (2017) LPELR-43940(SC) [verify citation, report and the exact holding before relying on it].
[23]Sheriffs and Civil Process Act (n 20) ss 20–31 and s 44 [confirm section numbers against the Act].
[24]Olatunji v Owena Bank Plc (2008) 8 NWLR (Pt 1090) 668 (SC) [add LPELR citation].
[25]Police Act 2020, s 32(2).
[26]Madaki v Guaranty Trust Bank Plc (2022) LPELR-57419(CA) [confirm full party names and holding].
About the Authors
Solagbade Oluwole An OOU and UNILAG law alumnus, ICAN (AAT) holder, and Senior Associate at Supo Ati-John & Co. specializing in corporate practice. An expert lecturer, insolvency practitioner, and debt recovery consultant, he frequently collaborates with Nigeria’s leading banks and security agencies like the EFCC to resolve complex financial disputes.
Avize Timothy An LL.B. candidate at the University of Hertfordshire with experience at Supo Ati-John & Co. and the Hertfordshire Law Clinic. She has handled legal research, tenancy, debt recovery, and employment matters. Avize served as ACS Inclusion Officer and aspires to specialize in private client, trusts, and wealth law.
Ogochukwu Mbah A University of Nigeria law graduate passionate about finance, fintech, and legal technology. Her undergraduate research focused on predictive analytics in the Nigerian legal profession. She has engaged in human rights advocacy and targets the legal and regulatory frameworks driving financial innovation and tech advancement in Nigeria.