Introduction
Nigeria’s search for a lasting solution to insecurity has taken a significant turn with the proposed establishment of State Police Services. On 18 November 2026, the Senate directed the transmission of the constitutional amendment bill to President Bola Tinubu for assent after all 36 State Houses of Assembly approved the proposal. The President has received the bill and indicated that he would review it in consultation with the Attorney-General of the Federation before signing it into law.
The proposal seeks to introduce a decentralised policing structure in which state police services would operate alongside the existing federal police. Its supporters consider this a necessary response to Nigeria’s persistent security challenges, arguing that policing closer to communities could improve intelligence gathering, emergency response and crime prevention.
However, beyond the promise of improved security lies a question Nigeria cannot afford to ignore: what happens when the power to protect citizens becomes vulnerable to the political interests of those entrusted with governing them?
A governor who exercises excessive influence over the police could potentially turn an institution established to protect lives and property into an instrument for intimidating opposition politicians, suppressing dissent and manipulating electoral processes.
While these concerns do not necessarily invalidate the idea of state policing, they expose the dangers of implementing such a fundamental reform without adequate constitutional safeguards and independent accountability mechanisms.
The question, therefore, is not merely whether Nigeria needs state police, but whether it is prepared to prevent the abuse of the very powers it seeks to create. A police force must protect the people, not become the personal security machinery of whoever occupies the Government House.
- Understanding the Proposed State Police Framework
Under the existing Section 214(1) of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, there shall be a Nigeria Police Force for the Federation, with no separate police force permitted for any part of the country.
This has historically placed policing under a centralised federal structure. However, the proposed Sixth Alteration Bill, 2026, seeks to replace this arrangement with a dual policing system comprising a Federal Police Service and State Police Services.
Under the proposed new Section 214, individual states would be permitted to establish their own police services through laws enacted by their respective Houses of Assembly. The Federal Police Service would, however, retain responsibility for federal policing functions, including the enforcement of federal laws, protection of federal institutions, terrorism, cybercrime, border security and offences with interstate or international dimensions.
State Police Services, on the other hand, would handle the enforcement of state laws, maintenance of public order, prevention and detection of offences within their jurisdiction, and protection of lives and property.
Importantly, the proposed arrangement does not permit states to commence operational policing merely by declaring their intention to establish a police force. Each State Police Service must first be established by state legislation and certified as meeting national minimum policing standards prescribed by an Act of the National Assembly. The Federal Police Service would continue to operate in each state until the relevant State Police Service satisfies these requirements.
The proposed Section 215 further provides for the appointment of a State Commander of Police by the Governor, upon the recommendation of the National Police Council and subject to confirmation by the State House of Assembly.
Although the Governor would be permitted to issue lawful written directions on general policy relating to public safety and public order, such directions must not require unlawful arrests, detention, politically motivated deployment, discrimination or the suppression of lawful political activities.
The amendment also proposes the establishment of State Police Service Commissions to exercise recruitment, disciplinary and oversight responsibilities, alongside national policing standards and provisions for federal intervention in exceptional circumstances, including serious abuse of fundamental rights and partisan or electoral intimidation.
These provisions demonstrate that the proposed framework recognises some of the dangers associated with decentralised policing and attempts to establish constitutional safeguards against them. Nevertheless, the existence of safeguards on paper does not automatically guarantee their effectiveness in practice. The real test will be whether these institutions possess sufficient independence, authority and institutional capacity to resist political pressure and hold erring officers accountable.
- When Security Becomes a Political Weapon
Perhaps the greatest concern surrounding the proposed establishment of State Police Services is not whether governors should participate in securing their respective states, but how far their influence over the police could extend.
In a country where political competition is often intense, and allegations of the misuse of state institutions are not uncommon, placing additional policing powers within the reach of state executives raises legitimate concerns about political persecution and electoral manipulation.
Consider a situation where a governor faces a formidable opposition candidate ahead of an election. What prevents the state police from being deployed to disrupt the opposition’s campaign, intimidate its supporters, arrest its members on questionable allegations or frustrate its political activities? What happens when journalists investigating the state government become targets of police harassment? Although these scenarios are hypothetical, they expose a genuine institutional risk: the possibility of an enforcement agency becoming an instrument for protecting political interests rather than public safety.
These concerns are not entirely absent from the legislative discussions. During the Senate’s deliberations on the amendment, Senator Adams Oshiomhole warned against the possibility of future governors using state police to intimidate political opponents. His intervention underscores the need to distinguish between establishing a police force that is responsive to local security challenges and creating one that is susceptible to the political ambitions of those in power.
It is important to acknowledge that the proposed amendment contains restrictions against unlawful directives, politically motivated arrests, discrimination and the suppression of lawful political activities. However, the existence of these prohibitions does not eliminate the need to examine how effectively they can be enforced, particularly where those exercising political influence over the institution may also wield considerable power over other state institutions.
The danger becomes even more pronounced during election periods, when the neutrality of law enforcement agencies is essential to the credibility of the electoral process. Police officers should protect candidates, political parties and voters equally, irrespective of their political affiliations. They should not become instruments for intimidating opponents, restricting lawful campaigns or creating an atmosphere of fear that discourages political participation.
Ultimately, the success of state policing must not be measured solely by its ability to combat kidnapping, banditry and other security threats. It must also be measured by its ability to resist political interference. A system that makes citizens safer from criminals but leaves them vulnerable to political persecution has not fulfilled its constitutional purpose.
- Beyond Political Persecution: Other Dangers of State Policing
The possibility of political interference is not the only concern surrounding the proposed state police structure. Nigeria must also confront the institutional, financial and human rights implications of operating multiple police services within a country with significant economic, ethnic and administrative differences.
First, there is the question of ethnic discrimination and unequal protection. Nigeria’s states are not ethnically homogeneous, and some contain substantial populations of ethnic and religious minorities. Without effective safeguards, a state police service dominated by the interests of a particular group could expose minorities and perceived outsiders to discriminatory treatment.
Policing must be based on the protection of every resident, not ethnic affiliation, religion or political loyalty. A system that allows local prejudices to influence law enforcement risks turning community policing into community intimidation.
Second, the financial implications cannot be overlooked. Establishing and maintaining a professional police service requires substantial investment in personnel, training, equipment, vehicles, communication infrastructure and welfare.
While the proposed amendment provides for direct funding of state police services, the ability of individual states to sustain these responsibilities remains a legitimate concern. States with stronger revenue bases may establish better-equipped services, while financially weaker states may struggle to maintain adequate standards.
This could create unequal access to security, leaving citizens’ protection dependent partly on the economic strength of the state in which they reside.
Third, the relationship between federal and state police could generate jurisdictional disputes. Criminal activities do not always respect state boundaries. Kidnappers, organised criminal networks and other offenders may operate across several states, raising questions about intelligence sharing, investigation, operational coordination and the exercise of police powers.
Although the proposed framework attempts to define the responsibilities of both institutions, the effectiveness of these arrangements will depend on clear procedures and cooperation between the different commands. Conflicting instructions or institutional rivalry could create gaps that criminals may exploit.
Finally, there is the danger of reproducing existing human rights abuses under a different administrative structure. Unlawful detention, extortion, excessive use of force and disregard for due process are not problems that disappear merely because policing becomes decentralised.
Without independent complaint mechanisms, credible investigations and effective remedies for victims, state police services could reproduce the same institutional failures Nigerians have long criticised.
These concerns do not necessarily justify abandoning state policing. Rather, they demonstrate that decentralisation alone is not reform. Nigeria must ensure that the creation of additional police institutions does not merely multiply the institutions through which citizens can experience discrimination, intimidation and abuse.
- The Constitutional Question: Who Holds the Police Accountable?
The establishment of State Police Services raises an important constitutional question: who will hold these institutions accountable when they violate the rights of the very citizens they are established to protect? Although the proposed amendment introduces safeguards against political interference and abuse, their effectiveness will ultimately depend on the institutions responsible for enforcing them.
Section 14(2)(b) of the 1999 Constitution identifies the security and welfare of the people as the primary purpose of government. This responsibility cannot be separated from the fundamental rights guaranteed under Chapter IV of the Constitution.
Sections 34 and 35 protect the dignity and personal liberty of individuals, while Section 36 guarantees fair hearing. These protections apply irrespective of whether an alleged violation is committed by federal or state police officers. Furthermore, Section 46 provides a mechanism through which persons whose fundamental rights have been, are being or are likely to be violated may seek redress before a competent court.
More significantly, the proposed Section 215(8) expressly prohibits governors’ directives requiring unlawful arrests, detention, politically motivated deployment, discrimination or the suppression of lawful political activities.
Proposed Section 216 also provides for national minimum policing standards covering recruitment, training, discipline, use of force, custody, complaints and public accountability. In addition, the proposed State Police Service Commission is assigned responsibilities relating to appointments, discipline, oversight and complaints. These provisions represent important attempts to prevent the abuse of state policing powers.
However, the existence of constitutional restrictions does not automatically guarantee compliance. A prohibition against political interference is only meaningful where violations can be independently investigated, and offenders held accountable.
It is therefore necessary to examine the composition, appointment procedures, financial independence and practical authority of State Police Service Commissions. If the institutions expected to investigate police misconduct are themselves vulnerable to political influence, the effectiveness of the safeguards becomes questionable.
The proposed Section 214(10) also provides for exceptional federal intervention where, among other circumstances, a State Police Service is involved in systematic violations of fundamental rights, partisan or electoral intimidation, or ethnic and religious persecution.
Such intervention is subject to written presidential authorisation, notification requirements and judicial review. Nevertheless, the conditions, duration and exercise of this intervention must be carefully regulated to prevent federal intervention from becoming another instrument of political influence.
Ultimately, state policing must operate within the supremacy of the Constitution and the rule of law. The authority to maintain public order does not confer the authority to violate fundamental rights, and no governor should be permitted to exercise police powers beyond constitutional limits. The real measure of a successful policing system is not simply the power it gives its officers, but the protection it guarantees against the abuse of that power.
- What Must Be Put in Place Before State Police Become Operational?
The establishment of State Police Services must not be treated as an achievement in itself. Its success will depend largely on the safeguards, institutional independence and accountability mechanisms established before officers are deployed. Nigeria must therefore look beyond the constitutional approval of state policing and address the practical measures necessary to prevent its abuse.
First, State Police Service Commissions must enjoy genuine institutional independence. Their recruitment, promotion and disciplinary responsibilities should not become extensions of the governor’s political authority. Transparent appointments, secure tenure and independent decision-making are necessary to ensure that officers are accountable to the law rather than the political interests of the state executive.
Second, the National Policing Bill must clearly define the operational boundaries between federal and state police services. It should establish effective coordination mechanisms, procedures for resolving jurisdictional disputes and clear rules governing intelligence sharing and joint investigations. Without these arrangements, overlapping responsibilities could undermine the very security objectives the reform seeks to achieve.
Third, there must be effective mechanisms for investigating allegations of police misconduct. Citizens should have access to independent complaint channels, prompt investigations and meaningful remedies where their rights are violated. Officers found guilty of unlawful arrests, brutality, extortion, or politically motivated intimidation must face appropriate consequences. No police uniform should confer immunity from the law.
Furthermore, recruitment and training must reflect the diversity of the states in which these services will operate. Merit, professionalism and respect for fundamental rights must take precedence over political loyalty, ethnic affiliation or religious considerations. Officers must receive adequate training in constitutional rights, arrest procedures, the use of force and the protection of vulnerable persons.
Finally, funding must be transparent, sustainable and subject to independent auditing. The direct funding arrangement proposed under the amendment should be supported by effective financial oversight to prevent diversion, mismanagement and the use of financial control as a means of influencing police operations.
These safeguards must not remain attractive provisions on paper. They must be translated into enforceable laws, independent institutions and practical accountability mechanisms. Nigeria does not merely need more police officers; it needs a policing system in which no political office holder is powerful enough to place himself above the law.
- Conclusion
Nigeria cannot afford to allow the legitimate demand for better security to become an excuse for creating another avenue for political oppression. State policing may offer an opportunity to address the limitations of centralised law enforcement, but its success must be measured not merely by how effectively it confronts criminals, but by how firmly it protects citizens against the abuse of authority.
The Constitution must remain superior to political interests, and no governor should possess powers that undermine the rights of those he is elected to serve. Ultimately, Nigeria does not need 36 additional instruments of political control disguised as security institutions. It needs 36 state police services that understand one fundamental principle: the police belong to the people, not to the government.
REFERENCES
Legislation
Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999
Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (Sixth Alteration) Bill 2026.
Electoral Act 2022.
National Human Rights Commission Act 1995 (as amended by the National Human Rights Commission (Amendment) Act 2010).
Police Act 2020 (No 5 of 2020).
Cases
Director of SSS v Agbakoba (1999) 3 NWLR (Pt 595) 314 (SC).
Fawehinmi v Abacha (2000) 6 NWLR (Pt 660) 228 (SC).
Inspector-General of Police v All Nigeria Peoples Party (2007) 18 NWLR (Pt 1066) 457 (CA).
Military Governor of Lagos State v Ojukwu (1986) 1 NWLR (Pt 18) 621 (SC).
Online Sources
Aborisade S, ‘Senate Sends State Police Bill to Tinubu, Demands Operational Guidelines’ (THISDAY, 18 November 2026) “https://www.thisdaylive.com/2026/11/18/senate-sends-state-police-bill-to-tinubu-demands-operational-guidelines/” (https://www.thisdaylive.com/2026/11/18/senate-sends-state-police-bill-to-tinubu-demands-operational-guidelines/).
Oyelakin S, ‘Tinubu Receives State Police Bill, to Consult AGF Before Assent’ (Punch, 18 November 2026) “https://punchng.com/tinubu-receives-state-police-bill-to-consult-agf-before-assent/” (https://punchng.com/tinubu-receives-state-police-bill-to-consult-agf-before-assent/).
Reuters, ‘Nigeria State Police Bill Clears Constitutional Hurdle After 28 States Approve’ (3 November 2026) “https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/nigeria-state-police-bill-clears-constitutional-hurdle-after-28-states-approve-2026-11-03/
Ume-Ezeoke G, ‘State Police: Senate Directs NASS Clerk to Transmit Amendment Bill to Tinubu for Assent’ (Channels Television, 18 November 2026) “https://www.channelstv.com/2026/11/18/state-police-senate-directs-amendment-bill-to-tinubu-for-assent/” (https://www.channelstv.com/2026/11/18/state-police-senate-directs-amendment-bill-to-tinubu-for-assent/).
Author
Oluwaleye Adedoyin Grace, LLB. (Hons.)[email protected] or 08106289069
