1.0 INTRODUCTION
The rapid advancement of technology has fundamentally changed the way people communicate, conduct business, obtain information and interact with one another. Social media platforms, instant messaging applications, digital financial services and artificial intelligence have created opportunities that were previously unimaginable.
However, the same technology that has made communication faster and more accessible has also created new avenues through which individuals can be deceived, harassed, threatened, defamed and exposed to serious harm. One of the most significant features of technology-enabled harm is its ability to move rapidly from the digital environment into the physical world.
A false publication can cause financial panic; a manipulated photograph can damage a person’s dignity and reputation; a fabricated allegation can expose an innocent person to mob violence; and a social media publication can eventually become the basis for police investigation, arrest and criminal prosecution. Recent events in Nigeria demonstrate this reality.
In August 2026, a false notice purporting to announce the shutdown of OPay’s Nigerian operations circulated widely online. The notice advised customers to withdraw their funds and reportedly attracted hundreds of thousands of views before OPay publicly dismissed it as false. [1]
The Nigeria Police Force National Cybercrime Centre subsequently arrested Hafsat Abubakar following a digital forensic investigation which, according to the police, traced the publication to her X account. [2]
In November 2025, Nigerian singer Ayra Starr became the subject of an AI-generated sexually explicit image. Reports stated that an X user had taken an authentic photograph of the singer and used artificial intelligence to create a false explicit representation which was subsequently circulated online. [3] The incident demonstrates how artificial intelligence can be used to manufacture false realities capable of causing serious violations of dignity, privacy and reputation.
Another disturbing incident occurred in October 2024 when Aisha Suleiman was falsely accused through social media of poisoning her former boyfriend and four others with pepper soup. The allegation spread rapidly, resulting in public hostility and an attempted mob attack. She was subsequently arrested and charged, but further investigation established that the victims had died from carbon monoxide poisoning caused by generator fumes rather than poisoning. [4]
In another case, Adeboye Samuel Adeyeye was convicted by the Federal High Court, Lagos, in May 2026 following social media publications concerning singer Adekunle Gold and his family. The court convicted him on three counts relating to cyberbullying, cyber threats and cyber harassment, with the relevant offences arising under section 24 of the Cybercrimes Act 2024 and section 375 of the Criminal Code Act. [5]
These incidents illustrate an important development in the Nigerian criminal justice landscape. Technology-enabled harm is no longer merely an issue concerning what happens on the internet. It increasingly determines how people enter the criminal justice system, how evidence is gathered and assessed, how victims seek protection and how accused persons defend themselves.
The question, therefore, is no longer simply whether Nigeria has laws capable of punishing cybercrime. The more fundamental question is whether the criminal justice system is sufficiently equipped to respond to technology-enabled harm while protecting the constitutional rights of victims, suspects and accused persons.
This article examines the changing nature of technology-enabled harm in Nigeria, the challenges it presents to criminal investigation and adjudication, the reliability of digital evidence, the role of different actors within the criminal justice system and the need for a balanced approach that protects individuals from digital abuse without allowing unverified online information to become a substitute for investigation and due process.
2.0 UNDERSTANDING TECHNOLOGY-ENABLED HARMS
Technology-enabled harm may broadly be described as harm facilitated, committed or amplified through the use of digital technologies. It may take the form of cyberstalking, cyberbullying, online harassment, threats, fraudulent communications, identity-related abuse, dissemination of false information, non-consensual sexualised images, impersonation, digital extortion and the manipulation of photographs, videos or audio recordings.
The Cybercrimes (Prohibition, Prevention, etc.) Act 2015, as amended in 2024, provides an important statutory framework for addressing several forms of cyber-related conduct in Nigeria. [6] The Act criminalises various forms of unlawful conduct involving computer systems and networks and provides investigative and institutional mechanisms for addressing cybercrime.
However, technology-enabled harm is not limited to offences expressly classified as cybercrime. An ordinary act of defamation, harassment, fraud or intimidation may acquire a significantly wider impact when committed through a digital platform.
Technology therefore does not necessarily create an entirely new form of misconduct; in many instances, it multiplies the speed, reach and consequences of conduct that already exists. A false allegation communicated orally to five people may cause harm.
The same allegation published on a social media platform can reach hundreds of thousands of people within minutes. The problem is therefore not simply that technology has created new offences. It has also changed the scale at which harm can occur.
3.0 THE CHANGING NATURE OF DIGITAL HARM IN NIGERIA
3.1 False Digital Information and Financial Panic
The OPay incident provides an important illustration of the consequences of fabricated digital information. On 31 August 2026, a notice circulated online claiming that OPay would suspend its operations in Nigeria from 1 September 2026 and advising customers to withdraw their funds. OPay subsequently described the notice as false. [7].
The publication reportedly attracted approximately 572,000 views within minutes. The police later stated that their investigation traced the publication to an X account operated by Hafsat Abubakar. [8]
The incident demonstrates how misinformation concerning a financial institution can create consequences beyond reputational damage. A false statement suggesting that a financial institution is about to cease operations can produce panic withdrawals, undermine confidence and potentially disrupt legitimate financial activities.
It also demonstrates the importance of proper digital investigation. Where an individual is accused of creating or circulating false information, investigators must establish not merely that the material appeared on an account but also the circumstances surrounding its creation, publication and dissemination.
Questions of authorship, intention, knowledge and causation may all become relevant. The fact that an individual shared a publication does not necessarily establish that the individual created it. Likewise, the fact that an individual operated an account does not automatically resolve every question concerning the origin or purpose of the material.
3.2 Artificial Intelligence and the Manufacture of False Reality
Artificial intelligence has introduced an additional layer of complexity into technology-enabled harm. The Ayra Starr incident illustrates the possibility of taking a genuine photograph and transforming it into a completely false and sexually explicit image.
Reports stated that an X user manipulated an image of the singer using AI and circulated the resulting image online. [9] The danger presented by such technology is considerable because the resulting material may appear sufficiently realistic to deceive persons who encounter it without additional verification. The problem is therefore not merely one of privacy.
AI-generated or manipulated content can affect dignity, reputation, mental wellbeing and personal security. It can also create evidential problems where fabricated content is later presented as genuine.
A photograph can be altered.
A video can be manipulated.
A person’s voice can be imitated.
A statement can be generated to appear as though it originated from someone who never made it. Consequently, the criminal justice system must increasingly ask not only: What does this digital material show?
but also:
How was it created, who created it and can its authenticity be established?
This distinction is becoming increasingly important as artificial intelligence becomes more accessible to ordinary users.
3.3 Viral Allegations and the Danger of Mob Justice
The case of Aisha Suleiman demonstrates one of the most dangerous consequences of online misinformation: the ability of a digital allegation to produce immediate physical consequences. Aisha was accused through social media of poisoning her former boyfriend and four others with pepper soup. The allegation spread and members of the community reportedly attacked her, tied her up and attempted to set her ablaze.
She was subsequently arrested and charged. [10] However, further investigation established that the victims had died from carbon monoxide poisoning caused by generator fumes. [11]
The incident demonstrates the danger of allowing the speed of social media to determine the speed of justice. A viral allegation is not proof. A social media post is not an investigation. Public outrage is not a substitute for evidence.
The criminal justice system must therefore distinguish between information that justifies investigation and information that establishes guilt. This distinction is particularly important because the consequences of an erroneous digital allegation may be irreversible. A person may lose their reputation, liberty, employment or even their life before the truth is established.
3.4 Cyberbullying, Threats and Criminal Liability
The conviction of Adeboye Samuel Adeyeye demonstrates that technology-enabled conduct may attract criminal consequences where the statutory requirements of an offence are established. The Federal High Court, Lagos, convicted Adeyeye on 15 May 2026 in IGP v Adeboye Samuel Adeyeye, Suit No. FHC/L/236C/26. Reports of the judgment indicate that he was convicted on three counts involving cyberbullying, cyber threats and online harassment directed at Adekunle Gold and his family. He was sentenced to concurrent terms of imprisonment. [12]
The case demonstrates the legitimate role of criminal law in protecting individuals from serious online abuse. However, criminal enforcement must remain subject to the requirements of the law. The fact that a publication is offensive, disturbing or unpopular does not automatically establish criminal liability.
The prosecution must prove the ingredients of the offence charged beyond reasonable doubt. The challenge, therefore, is to maintain an appropriate balance between protecting individuals from genuine digital abuse and ensuring that criminal law is not used merely because an online publication has generated public anger.
4.0 TECHNOLOGY-ENABLED HARMS AND ENTRY INTO THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM
Technology has altered the traditional pathway through which individuals enter the criminal justice system. Previously, a complaint might arise from a physical incident, eyewitness testimony, documentary evidence or a formal report. Today, an individual may enter the criminal justice system because of a WhatsApp message, an X post, an Instagram publication, a TikTok video or an AI-generated image. This creates both opportunities and dangers.
Digital information may provide investigators with valuable evidence. It can assist in identifying suspects, reconstructing events and establishing communication between individuals. However, digital information can also be false, incomplete, manipulated or taken out of context. The danger therefore arises when visibility is mistaken for credibility. A post viewed by one million people is not necessarily more truthful than a post viewed by ten people.
A photograph that appears genuine is not necessarily authentic. A screenshot is not automatically proof of the circumstances surrounding its creation. The criminal justice system must therefore ensure that the popularity of digital content does not determine its evidential value.
5.0 DIGITAL EVIDENCE: AUTHENTICITY, RELIABILITY AND ADMISSIBILITY
The increasing reliance on electronic communication has made digital evidence an important component of modern litigation and criminal prosecution. The Evidence Act 2011, as amended, provides the statutory framework governing the admissibility of computer-generated evidence. Section 84 is particularly important because it establishes conditions under which statements contained in computer-generated documents may be admitted in evidence. [13]
The courts have considered these requirements in several cases, including Kubor v Dickson, where the Supreme Court addressed the admissibility of electronically generated evidence. [14] However, admissibility is only one aspect of digital evidence. The more fundamental issue in many technology-related cases is authenticity.
An investigator or court may need to determine:
- Who created the material?
- When was it created?
- From which device or account did it originate?
- Who controlled the account?
- Has the material been altered?
- Does available metadata support the alleged history of the material?
- Is the screenshot complete or selective?
- Has an image, video or audio recording been manipulated?
- Has the evidence been properly preserved?
- Can the chain of custody be established?
These questions become even more important where the evidence has been created or altered using artificial intelligence. The existence of digital evidence should therefore not end the investigation. Rather, it should begin a further inquiry into its source, integrity and reliability.
6.0 THE ROLE OF THE POLICE IN TECHNOLOGY-ENABLED CASES
The police occupy the first major institutional position in responding to technology-enabled harm. The Nigeria Police Force therefore requires the technical capacity to investigate offences committed through digital platforms as well as offences involving manipulated or synthetic digital evidence. The investigation of digital offences should not merely involve tracing an account and arresting its suspected operator.
Investigators must establish the circumstances surrounding the creation and dissemination of the material. Where a false document is circulated, for instance, investigators should consider who created it, who first published it, who knowingly amplified it, whether the accused knew it was false, whether the accused controlled the relevant account and what harm resulted. This is important because an individual may share information without knowing that it is false. An account may also be compromised. A device may be used by another person. A digital identity may be impersonated. The police must therefore avoid treating technological attribution as though it were always equivalent to proof of criminal responsibility. Digital forensic investigation should support the factual investigation rather than replace it.
7.0 THE ROLE OF THE PROSECUTOR
The prosecutor has an independent responsibility to evaluate the evidence gathered during investigation. The fact that a person has been arrested does not mean that a prosecutable case has been established. The prosecution must determine whether the available evidence establishes all the ingredients of the alleged offence and whether there is sufficient evidence to sustain a conviction. This becomes particularly important in cases involving online publications because questions of authorship, intention, context and authenticity may arise. A prosecutor should therefore not rely solely on screenshots, viral publications or public pressure.
The fundamental question must remain: Can the available evidence establish the offence beyond reasonable doubt? The prosecutor must also consider whether the available evidence was lawfully obtained and whether reliance upon it would be consistent with the accused person’s constitutional rights.
8.0 THE ROLE OF DEFENCE COUNSEL
Defence counsel performs an equally important function in technology-related criminal proceedings. Where the prosecution relies upon digital evidence, defence counsel should examine its authenticity, source, integrity and context. The defence may question whether the accused actually created or published the material, whether the accused controlled the relevant account, whether the material has been altered, whether the original material has been produced and whether the statutory requirements governing electronic evidence have been satisfied. Defence counsel may also challenge the prosecution’s interpretation of the digital material.
For example, a screenshot may contain only a portion of a conversation. A video may have been edited. A photograph may have been digitally manipulated. An account may have been accessed by another person. These possibilities do not necessarily establish innocence, but they demonstrate why the prosecution must establish its case with reliable evidence. The role of defence counsel is therefore not to protect harmful conduct. It is to ensure that criminal liability is imposed on the basis of proof and law rather than public outrage.
9.0 THE ROLE OF THE COURTS
The courts remain the ultimate institutional safeguard against wrongful criminalisation. The Constitution guarantees the dignity of the human person under section 34, personal liberty under section 35 and fair hearing under section 36. It also protects privacy under section 37 and freedom of expression under section 39, subject to lawful limitations. [15] These constitutional protections remain applicable in the digital environment.
The fact that an alleged offence was committed through a smartphone or social media platform does not reduce the constitutional rights of the person accused. The court must therefore balance two legitimate interests. First, society has a legitimate interest in protecting individuals and institutions from serious digital abuse. Second, persons accused of digital offences retain their constitutional rights.
The court must determine whether the prosecution has established the offence charged and whether the evidence relied upon is sufficiently reliable and legally admissible. The emergence of AI-generated material makes this responsibility even more important. The court must increasingly be prepared to examine not only the content of digital evidence but also its origin and authenticity.
10.0 PROTECTING VICTIMS WITHOUT CREATING WRONGFUL CRIMINALISATION
An effective criminal justice system must protect victims of technology-enabled harm. Victims of online harassment, threats, cyberstalking, non-consensual sexualised images and other forms of digital abuse should have accessible mechanisms for reporting incidents and obtaining timely assistance. However, protecting victims must not mean abandoning due process. There is an important distinction between taking a complaint seriously and assuming that the complaint is true.
The first is necessary for justice.
The second may produce injustice.
The experience of Aisha illustrates this danger. She was reportedly attacked and detained following an allegation that was later shown to be false. [16]
The incident demonstrates that the criminal justice system must respond quickly to complaints while still subjecting allegations to proper investigation.
A victim deserves protection.
A suspect deserves due process.
These principles are not contradictory. They are both essential components of justice.
11.0 THE CONSTITUTIONAL BALANCE BETWEEN DIGITAL SAFETY AND FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS
Nigeria’s response to technology-enabled harm must operate within the constitutional framework. Section 34 protects dignity; section 35 protects personal liberty; section 36 guarantees fair hearing; section 37 protects privacy; and section 39 protects freedom of expression. [17]
These provisions should not be viewed as obstacles to combating cybercrime. They are safeguards against arbitrary exercise of state power. The Cybercrimes Act, as amended in 2024, provides an important statutory framework for addressing cyber-related offences. [18] However, enforcement must remain consistent with constitutional protections.
This is particularly important because laws dealing with online speech and cyber-related conduct may affect the exercise of freedom of expression. The proper approach is therefore not to choose between digital safety and constitutional rights. Nigeria requires both.
12.0 THE NEED FOR DIGITAL FORENSIC CAPACITY
The sophistication of technology-enabled offences requires corresponding sophistication in investigation. Law enforcement agencies should invest in trained digital forensic investigators, proper preservation and extraction of electronic evidence, techniques for identifying manipulated images and videos, metadata analysis, secure evidence storage and proper chain-of-custody procedures.
Investigators should also receive specialised training on artificial intelligence and synthetic media. This is particularly important because digital offenders may attempt to conceal their identities through anonymous accounts, multiple devices, impersonation or other technological methods.
However, technological capability without legal discipline can itself create serious risks. Digital forensic powers should therefore be exercised in accordance with the law and subject to appropriate safeguards. The objective should be to develop a justice system that is technologically capable without becoming technologically reckless.
13.0 DIGITAL LITERACY AS A CRIMINAL JUSTICE TOOL
The responsibility for combating technology-enabled harm does not belong exclusively to the police, prosecutors and courts. Citizens also have an important role to play. Members of the public should learn to verify information before sharing it, particularly information concerning deaths, financial institutions, criminal allegations and public emergencies.
The OPay incident illustrates the importance of this responsibility. OPay itself urged customers to rely on its verified communication channels rather than unverified messages circulating online. [19] Where a person becomes a victim of digital abuse, relevant evidence should also be preserved rather than immediately deleted. Screenshots, account details, timestamps, original files, URLs and other relevant information may assist subsequent investigation. More importantly, citizens must understand that forwarding information is not always harmless. A person who creates false information and another person who knowingly amplifies it may both contribute to the resulting harm. Digital literacy should therefore form part of broader civic education in Nigeria.
14.0 THE NEED FOR A MORE RESPONSIVE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM
The changing nature of technology-enabled harm requires a corresponding transformation in the criminal justice system.
14.1 From Reactive Investigation to Early Detection
Justice institutions should develop mechanisms for identifying emerging forms of digital harm before they become widespread. Early identification may prevent a false narrative from becoming a public crisis.
14.2 From Digital Presence to Digital Verification
The existence of online material should not automatically be treated as proof of its authenticity. Investigators and courts should adopt a culture of verification.
14.3 From Arrest-Centred Response to Evidence-Centred Response
An effective justice system should not measure success simply by the number of persons arrested. The focus should be on whether the evidence establishes criminal responsibility.
14.4 From Traditional Training to Technological Competence
Police officers, prosecutors, lawyers and judges must understand the technologies that increasingly form part of criminal investigations. Without such knowledge, the justice system may either fail to prosecute genuine digital offences or wrongly attribute manipulated evidence to innocent persons.
15.0 RECOMMENDATIONS
15.1 Strengthening Digital Forensic Investigation
The Nigeria Police Force and other relevant agencies should continuously strengthen their digital forensic capabilities and provide investigators with regular training in emerging technologies.
15.2 Development of Digital Evidence Guidelines
There is a need for clear practical guidelines concerning the authentication, preservation, extraction and presentation of electronic evidence, particularly AI-generated and manipulated material.
15.3 Protection of Fundamental Rights
Investigative agencies must ensure that arrests, searches, seizures and detention in technology-related cases are carried out strictly according to law. The existence of digital evidence should not automatically justify prolonged detention or disregard for constitutional safeguards.
15.4 Specialised Training for Lawyers and Judges
Lawyers and judicial officers should acquire sufficient understanding of emerging technologies to identify issues of manipulation, authenticity, provenance and reliability.The law cannot effectively regulate evidence that its practitioners do not understand.
15.5 Public Digital Literacy
Government agencies, educational institutions, civil society organisations and technology companies should promote digital literacy programmes focusing on misinformation, online harassment, artificial intelligence-generated content, privacy and responsible digital behaviour.
15.6 Accessible Victim Support
Victims of online abuse should have accessible channels through which harmful content can be reported, preserved and investigated while appropriate legal remedies are pursued.
15.7 Responsible Enforcement of Cybercrime Laws
The Cybercrimes Act should be applied carefully so that genuine cybercrime is effectively prosecuted without unnecessarily criminalising legitimate criticism, lawful expression or innocent dissemination of information. The distinction between harmful conduct and unpopular speech must remain clear.
16.0 CONCLUSION
Technology has changed the way harm is created, distributed and experienced. A false notice can cause financial panic. A manipulated photograph can violate dignity. An unverified allegation can trigger mob violence. A social media publication can become the beginning of a criminal investigation and, ultimately, a criminal trial. The challenge before Nigeria is therefore greater than simply enacting laws against cybercrime.
The criminal justice system must develop the capacity to recognise digital harm, investigate it properly, authenticate digital evidence, protect victims and respect the rights of suspects. The lessons from recent incidents are particularly important: virality is not proof, a screenshot is not automatically truth, and an allegation is not a conviction.
At the same time, the possibility of manipulated digital evidence should not become an excuse for allowing genuine digital abuse to go unpunished. The appropriate response lies in a justice system that is technologically competent but legally disciplined; capable of responding quickly but careful enough to investigate properly; protective of victims but fair to accused persons. Ultimately, the success of Nigeria’s criminal justice response to technology-enabled harm should not be measured merely by the number of arrests or prosecutions.
It should be measured by whether the system can protect people from digital harm without creating new victims through wrongful arrest, unreliable evidence, unlawful detention or unjust conviction. As the boundary between the digital and physical worlds continues to disappear, criminal justice must evolve with technology—but it must never lose sight of the human being at the centre of justice.
REFERENCES
[1] TheCable Fact Check, ‘DISINFO ALERT: Notice of shutdown false, says OPay’ (31 August 2026). The report stated that the notice claimed OPay would suspend transactions and account-related services from 1 September 2026, while OPay denied the claim. [2] TheCable, ‘Police arrest woman who spread false OPay shutdown notice on X’ (10 September 2026); Premium Times, ‘Police arrest suspect over fake shutdown report targeting OPay’ (10 September 2026). The police stated that a digital forensic investigation traced the publication to Hafsat Abubakar’s X account. [3] Pulse Nigeria, ‘Fans Defend Ayra Starr After AI Nude Edit Goes Viral’ (18 November 2025). The report stated that an X user used AI to create a false explicit image from photographs posted by Ayra Starr. [4] Punch, ‘VIDEO: Girl falsely accused of poisoning five, speaks out after being cleared’ (1 February 2025). [5] IGP v Adeboye Samuel Adeyeye, Suit No. FHC/L/236C/26, Federal High Court, Lagos, judgment delivered 15 May 2026; The Guardian, ‘Adekunle Gold to drag more social media users to court over defamation’ (18 May 2026). [6] Cybercrimes (Prohibition, Prevention, etc.) Act 2015, as amended by the Cybercrimes (Prohibition, Prevention, etc.) (Amendment) Act 2024. [7] TheCable Fact Check (n 1). [8] TheCable (2). The police stated that the publication had recorded approximately 572,000 views within minutes. [9] Pulse Nigeria (3). See also Pulse Nigeria, ‘Ayra Starr Was Violated Online And She’s Not the Only One’ (20 November 2025), discussing the alleged creation and circulation of the manipulated image. [10] Punch (4). The report stated that Aisha was confronted, publicly humiliated and attacked by community members before authorities intervened. [11] Ibid. The investigation reportedly established carbon monoxide poisoning from generator fumes as the cause of death. [12] The Guardian (5). The report stated that the defendant was sentenced to two years on Count 1 under section 24(1)(b) of the Cybercrimes Act 2024, two years on Count 2 under section 24(2)(i), and one year on Count 3 under section 375 of the Criminal Code Act, with the sentences running concurrently. [13] Sec.84 Evidence Act 2011 (as amended) [14] Kubor v Dickson (2013) 4 NWLR (Pt 1345) 534 (SC). [15] Sec. 34–39 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 [16] Punch (4). [17] Sec. 34–39 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended) [18] Cybercrimes (Prohibition, Prevention, etc.) Act 2015, as amended by the Cybercrimes (Prohibition, Prevention, etc.) (Amendment) Act 2024. [19] TheCable Fact Check (1). OPay advised customers to verify information through its official communication channels.
Author
Job Joseph, DL, LL.B(Hons) ABU Zaria.