INTRODUCTION
How far can the National Assembly go in regulating the affairs of political parties before electoral regulation becomes unconstitutional interference? This question has once again come before the Nigerian courts following the Supreme Court’s recent decision on sections 77(5), 77(6), 77(7) and 84(2) of the Electoral Act 2026.
On 24 September 2026, the Supreme Court, in a unanimous decision delivered by a seven-member panel led by Justice Adamu Jauro, allowed the appeal of the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC), set aside the judgment of the Court of Appeal and restored the decision of the Federal High Court, which had dismissed the constitutional challenge brought by the Zenith Labour Party (ZLP). The apex court held that the disputed provisions were not inconsistent with the 1999 Constitution.
The decision has brought renewed attention to the constitutional relationship between the National Assembly, INEC and political parties. Sections 77(5)–(7) impose statutory requirements concerning the membership registers of political parties, while section 84(2) prescribes direct primaries or consensus as the methods for nominating candidates for elective positions.
This article examines the Supreme Court’s decision against that constitutional background. It considers the nature of the disputed provisions, the arguments over political-party autonomy and legislative regulation, the reasoning of the lower courts, and the implications of the Supreme Court’s decision for political parties, INEC, and the conduct of future elections in Nigeria.
- BACKGROUND TO THE DISPUTE
The dispute originated from a constitutional challenge brought by the Zenith Labour Party (ZLP) against certain provisions of the Electoral Act 2026. The party challenged sections 77(5), 77(6), 77(7), and 84(2), arguing that the provisions unlawfully interfered with the internal administration of political parties, particularly their membership registers and the nomination of candidates for elective offices. The action was instituted at the Federal High Court in Abuja in Suit No. FHC/ABJ/509/2026.
At the Federal High Court, ZLP argued that the challenged provisions were inconsistent with the constitutional framework governing political parties, particularly sections 221 and 222 of the 1999 Constitution. The party’s contention was, in substance, that the Constitution had already recognised certain powers of political parties in relation to their organisation and sponsorship of candidates, and that the Electoral Act could not validly impose statutory requirements that restricted those powers. On 5 May 2026, however, Justice Mohammed Umar dismissed the suit.
Dissatisfied with the decision, ZLP appealed to the Court of Appeal, Abuja Division, in Appeal No. CA/ABJ/CV/750/2026. On 16 July 2026, the Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part and declared sections 77(5), 77(6), 77(7) and 84(2) of the Electoral Act unconstitutional. The appellate court considered the provisions inconsistent with sections 221 and 222 of the Constitution, particularly to the extent that they regulated aspects of political parties’ membership and candidate-selection processes.
The Court of Appeal’s decision effectively created a conflict between the statutory framework established by the Electoral Act and the constitutional position of political parties. The decision also had immediate electoral significance because the affected provisions concerned the conduct of party primaries, membership registers and the nomination of candidates ahead of the 2027 general elections.
INEC, dissatisfied with the appellate decision, appealed to the Supreme Court. The apex court subsequently heard the appeal and, on 24 September 2026, unanimously allowed INEC’s appeal, set aside the Court of Appeal’s judgment and restored the decision of the Federal High Court. The Supreme Court held that the disputed provisions were not inconsistent with the 1999 Constitution and awarded costs of N2 million against ZLP.
The case therefore travelled through three levels of judicial consideration, producing different conclusions at the Federal High Court and Court of Appeal before the Supreme Court ultimately settled the dispute. The central question emerging from this judicial journey is not merely whether the four provisions are valid, but how the Constitution should balance the legislative regulation of elections with the constitutional position and internal autonomy of political parties.
- THE CONTESTED PROVISIONS OF THE ELECTORAL ACT 2026
The constitutional controversy before the courts centred on four provisions of the Electoral Act 2026: sections 77(5), 77(6), 77(7) and 84(2). Although the provisions deal with different aspects of party organisation and candidate nomination, they share a common feature: they impose statutory requirements on the way political parties conduct certain internal electoral processes.
3.1 Membership Registers: Sections 77(5), 77(6) and 77(7)
Section 77(5) provides that only persons whose names are contained in a political party’s membership register submitted to the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) not later than 21 days before the date fixed for a primary, congress or convention are eligible to participate in the relevant exercise.
The provision therefore creates a connection between a party’s membership register and participation in its internal electoral process. A person who is not included in the register submitted to INEC within the prescribed period cannot participate merely by asserting membership of the political party.
Section 77(6) goes further by providing that a political party shall not use a membership register other than the one submitted to INEC for its primaries, congresses and conventions. The provision seeks to establish a fixed and verifiable register against which participation in these exercises can be determined.
Section 77(7) attaches a more significant consequence to non-compliance. Where a political party fails to submit its membership register within the prescribed period, the party becomes ineligible to field a candidate for the election.
Taken together, these provisions do more than require political parties to maintain membership records. They regulate the register to be used for specified party activities, prescribe a deadline for its submission to INEC and attach an electoral consequence to failure to comply.
3.2 Candidate Nomination: Section 84(2)
Section 84(2) addresses another important aspect of internal party organisation: the nomination of candidates for elective offices.
The provision prescribes direct primaries or consensus as the methods through which political parties are to nominate candidates. Consequently, the statute does not leave the choice of nomination method entirely to the discretion of individual political parties.
This provision is particularly significant because candidate nomination ordinarily occurs within the internal structure of a political party. The question therefore arises whether the National Assembly, in regulating the electoral process, may prescribe the manner in which a political party must select the person it intends to sponsor for an election.
3.3 Why the Provisions Became Constitutionally Controversial
The controversy was not simply about whether political parties should maintain membership registers or whether elections should be conducted transparently. The deeper issue was who has the constitutional authority to determine the rules governing these internal processes.
ZLP argued that the provisions interfered with the constitutional position and internal affairs of political parties, relying principally on sections 221 and 222 of the 1999 Constitution. The Court of Appeal accepted that argument and declared the four provisions unconstitutional. It reasoned, among other things, that the National Assembly could not impose statutory restrictions that conflicted with powers constitutionally recognised as belonging to political parties.
The Supreme Court subsequently took a different position. In its judgment of 24 September 2026, it restored the provisions, holding that they were not inconsistent with the Constitution.
The significance of the dispute therefore lies in the constitutional boundary between electoral regulation and political-party autonomy. If Parliament can prescribe the register that a party must use, the deadline for submitting that register and the method by which candidates may be nominated, the next question is whether there are constitutional limits to that legislative power. It is this question that gives the Supreme Court’s decision its wider constitutional significance.
- CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR POLITICAL PARTIES
The validity of the disputed provisions of the Electoral Act 2026 cannot be determined by examining the Act in isolation. The starting point must be the Constitution, which remains the supreme law of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. Section 1(1) of the 1999 Constitution establishes its supremacy, while section 1(3) renders any law inconsistent with its provisions void to the extent of the inconsistency.
Consequently, the question before the courts was not simply whether the National Assembly had enacted provisions regulating political parties, but whether those provisions were consistent with the constitutional framework governing political parties and elections.
Political parties occupy a constitutionally recognised position within Nigeria’s democratic structure. Section 221 of the Constitution provides that no association other than a political party may canvass for votes for a candidate at an election or contribute to the funds of a political party or the election expenses of a candidate.
Section 222 further establishes conditions that an association must satisfy before it can function as a political party, including the registration of its national officers and constitution with the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC), and the requirement that its membership be open to every Nigerian citizen irrespective of specified personal or social characteristics.
These provisions demonstrate that political parties are neither ordinary private associations nor institutions operating entirely outside state regulation. Their constitutional role is tied directly to the electoral process. At the same time, the Constitution recognises their existence and functions within the democratic system, raising an important question about the extent to which legislation may regulate their internal affairs.
Section 223 strengthens this constitutional framework by requiring the constitution and rules of a political party to provide for the periodic election, on a democratic basis, of its principal officers and governing bodies, while also requiring those bodies to reflect the federal character of Nigeria. The constitutional framework therefore contemplates a measure of regulation of political-party organisation even before the Electoral Act is considered.
This distinction is important to the controversy surrounding sections 77(5), 77(6), 77(7) and 84(2) of the Electoral Act 2026. The existence of constitutional recognition for political parties does not necessarily mean that every aspect of their internal affairs is immune from legislative regulation. Equally, the fact that the National Assembly possesses legislative authority over elections does not mean that every statutory restriction imposed upon political parties is automatically constitutional.
The real constitutional inquiry, therefore, lies in determining the boundary between these two interests: the autonomy and constitutional position of political parties on one hand, and the power of the legislature to establish rules governing the electoral process on the other.
It was against this constitutional background that the Zenith Labour Party challenged the disputed provisions, arguing that they amounted to an unconstitutional intrusion into the internal affairs of political parties. The Supreme Court’s subsequent decision that the provisions were not inconsistent with the Constitution therefore requires an examination of the constitutional and legislative powers upon which such regulation rests.
5.0 LEGISLATIVE POWER, POLITICAL PARTY AUTONOMY AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL BOUNDARY
The dispute ultimately turns on the relationship between the National Assembly’s power to regulate elections and the constitutional position of political parties. While the National Assembly possesses legislative authority over electoral matters, that authority must be exercised within the limits imposed by the Constitution.
Section 4 of the 1999 Constitution vests legislative powers of the Federal Republic of Nigeria in the National Assembly, while the Constitution itself contemplates legislation regulating the electoral process. This provides the foundation upon which the Electoral Act is enacted. However, section 1(3) makes clear that any law inconsistent with the Constitution is void to the extent of the inconsistency. Legislative power over elections is therefore broad, but not unlimited.
The difficulty arises because some electoral regulations necessarily affect the internal affairs of political parties. Sections 77(5), 77(6) and 77(7) of the Electoral Act regulate the membership registers used by parties for their internal exercises, while section 84(2) prescribes direct primaries or consensus for candidate nomination. These provisions therefore operate at the point where electoral regulation meets party organisation.
Political parties, however, do not exist outside the constitutional framework. Sections 221 and 222 of the Constitution recognise their role in Nigeria’s electoral system and establish conditions governing their operation. Section 223a further requires their constitutions and rules to provide for periodic elections of principal officers and governing bodies on a democratic basis. The constitutional recognition of political parties therefore does not mean that their internal affairs are completely immune from legal regulation.
At the same time, constitutional recognition cannot be rendered meaningless by an assumption that Parliament may regulate every aspect of party organisation merely because it has some connection with elections. There must be a sufficient constitutional basis for the particular regulation.
The central question is therefore not whether political parties are autonomous or whether the National Assembly can regulate elections. Both propositions can coexist. The real question is whether a particular statutory requirement is a legitimate regulation of the electoral process or an impermissible intrusion into matters constitutionally reserved for political parties.
The membership-register provisions provide an example. Requiring parties to submit a register to INEC creates a verifiable record for determining participation in party primaries, congresses and conventions. Similarly, prescribing recognised methods of candidate nomination under section 84(2) directly relates to the process through which persons are selected to contest public elections. These provisions therefore have an identifiable connection with the electoral process, even though they affect internal party procedures.
This distinction is important because political parties occupy a unique position in a constitutional democracy. They are associations with internal structures, but they are also the principal vehicles through which candidates emerge for public office. Their internal processes can therefore have consequences for the wider electoral system.
The constitutional boundary should consequently be understood as one of legislative purpose, constitutional authority and proportional connection to the electoral process. Where legislation regulates an aspect of party organisation because of its direct relationship with participation in elections, its constitutional justification is stronger. Where legislation seeks to control matters without a sufficient connection to the electoral process or in a manner inconsistent with an express constitutional provision, the question of validity becomes more serious.
The Supreme Court’s decision is significant within this framework. By restoring the disputed provisions and holding them not inconsistent with the Constitution, the Court accepted that the particular regulations fell within the permissible sphere of electoral regulation. The decision does not, however, mean that every future regulation of political parties will automatically be constitutional. The Constitution remains the ultimate standard against which legislative action must be measured.
Thus, the constitutional balance is not between absolute party autonomy and unlimited legislative power. Rather, both operate within the same constitutional order. The National Assembly may regulate the electoral process, while political parties retain their constitutionally recognised status and internal structures. The enduring task is to ensure that regulation does not cross the boundary into unconstitutional interference.
- WHAT THE SUPREME COURT DECIDED
The Supreme Court ultimately rejected the constitutional challenge to the disputed provisions of the Electoral Act 2026. In a unanimous decision delivered on 24 September 2026 by a seven-member panel led by Justice Adamu Jauro, the Court allowed the appeal brought by the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC), set aside the judgment of the Court of Appeal and restored the judgment of the Federal High Court which had dismissed the Zenith Labour Party’s challenge.
The effect of the decision is that sections 77(5), 77(6), 77(7) and 84(2) remain operative. The Supreme Court held that the disputed provisions were not inconsistent with the 1999 Constitution. It also awarded costs of N2 million against the Zenith Labor Party.
The decision is significant because it reverses the constitutional conclusion reached by the Court of Appeal. The appellate court had regarded the provisions as an unconstitutional interference with matters relating to political parties, whereas the Supreme Court restored the statutory framework enacted by the National Assembly.
6.1 The Membership Register Requirements
The first part of the dispute concerned sections 77(5), 77(6) and 77(7). These provisions establish a statutory framework linking a political party’s membership register to participation in its primaries, congresses and conventions.
Under section 77(5), only members whose names appear in the register submitted to INEC within the prescribed period may participate in the relevant exercise. Section 77(6) requires the party to use the register submitted to INEC, while section 77(7) attaches the consequence of being unable to field a candidate where the party fails to submit its register within the prescribed period.
By restoring these provisions, the Supreme Court effectively confirmed that these requirements can validly form part of the statutory framework governing political-party electoral processes. The judgment therefore recognises that Parliament may impose verifiable rules concerning party membership registers where those rules are connected with the electoral process.
This is particularly important because the Court was not being asked merely to determine whether political parties should keep membership records. The more difficult question was whether the legislature could make compliance with particular membership-register requirements a condition affecting participation in party exercises and, ultimately, the party’s ability to field a candidate.
The Supreme Court’s answer was affirmative.
6.2 Candidate Nomination and Section 84(2)
The second major issue concerned section 84(2), which provides that political parties are to nominate candidates through direct primaries or consensus. The provision therefore establishes statutory parameters for the process through which parties select the individuals they intend to sponsor in elections.
This provision presents a particularly important constitutional question because candidate selection ordinarily takes place within the internal structures of political parties. The Supreme Court’s decision nevertheless confirms the validity of the statutory requirement, rejecting the argument that the provision is inconsistent with the constitutional framework governing political parties.
The significance of this conclusion extends beyond the immediate dispute. It demonstrates that the existence of constitutional recognition for political parties does not, by itself, place their candidate-nomination procedures beyond legislative regulation.
6.3 The Supreme Court’s Reversal of the Court of Appeal
The importance of the judgment becomes clearer when the two appellate positions are placed side by side.
The Court of Appeal treated the disputed provisions as inconsistent with the constitutional position of political parties and consequently voided them. The Supreme Court reached the opposite conclusion and restored the statutory provisions.
The Supreme Court’s decision therefore establishes, for the purposes of the present Electoral Act, that Parliament’s regulation of membership registers and candidate nomination does not necessarily amount to unconstitutional interference merely because the regulation affects the internal processes of political parties.
However, this should not be interpreted as establishing an unlimited legislative power over political parties. The Supreme Court’s decision concerned the particular provisions placed before it. The broader constitutional limitation remains that legislation must be consistent with the Constitution, pursuant to the principle of constitutional supremacy under section 1.
The better understanding of the judgment is therefore that political-party autonomy and legislative regulation are not mutually exclusive concepts. A political party may retain internal organizational autonomy while remaining subject to statutory requirements that regulate aspects of its participation in the electoral process.
The judgment consequently shifts the constitutional inquiry from whether Parliament may regulate political parties at all to a more precise question: whether a particular regulation has a sufficient connection with the electoral process and remains consistent with the Constitution.
That distinction is perhaps the most important lesson to be drawn from the dispute. The Supreme Court did not merely restore four provisions of the Electoral Act; it affirmed the continuing relevance of statutory regulation in an area where political-party autonomy and electoral integrity intersect.
- IMPLICATIONS FOR POLITICAL PARTIES AND THE 2027 ELECTIONS
The Supreme Court’s decision has practical consequences for political parties, particularly as Nigeria moves towards the 2027 general elections. By restoring sections 77(5), 77(6), 77(7) and 84(2) of the Electoral Act 2026, the Court has reinstated statutory requirements that parties must take into account when organizing their membership registers, conducting internal elections and nominating candidates.
First, political parties must pay close attention to the membership-register requirements. Section 77(5) ties participation in a primary, congress or convention to the membership register submitted to INEC within the prescribed period, while section 77(6) requires the party to use that submitted register for the relevant exercise. Section 77(7) attaches a significant consequence to failure to comply by providing that a party that fails to submit its register within the prescribed period is not eligible to field a candidate for the election.
The practical significance is considerable. Disputes over who was entitled to participate in a party primary may increasingly turn on documentary questions: What register did the party submit? When was it submitted? Whose names appeared on it? Was the same register used during the relevant party exercise? These questions may become particularly important where the outcome of a primary is challenged in court.
Second, section 84(2) places a statutory requirement on political parties concerning candidate nomination. With the provision restored, parties must conduct nominations through the methods recognized by the Act, namely direct primaries or consensus. The provision therefore remains relevant to the validity of future nomination processes.
Third, the decision provides greater legal certainty regarding the statutory framework applicable to future party primaries and nominations. The Court of Appeal’s judgment had created uncertainty by declaring the provisions unconstitutional. The Supreme Court’s reversal means that, at the apex-court level, the provisions have been upheld and remain part of the governing electoral framework.
However, an important distinction must be made between the validity of the provisions themselves and the validity of an individual candidate’s nomination. The Supreme Court’s decision settled the constitutional challenge to the statutory provisions; it did not, by itself, determine the validity or invalidity of every nomination conducted by every political party. Whether a particular nomination complied with sections 77 or 84 would depend on the facts of that particular case and, where challenged, the determination of a competent court.
The judgment may therefore generate further litigation rather than eliminate electoral disputes entirely. Questions concerning the accuracy of membership registers, the timing of their submission, compliance with prescribed nomination procedures and the consequences of alleged non-compliance may still arise before the courts.
There is also a broader institutional implication for INEC. The restored provisions give the Commission a statutory role in receiving and retaining political-party membership registers and provide a reference point for determining compliance with particular party procedures. This does not transform INEC into the manager of political parties; rather, it places the Commission within a statutory framework designed to connect certain aspects of party organization with the wider electoral process.
For political parties, the message is therefore one of strict compliance with statutory requirements. Internal party procedures that might previously have been treated primarily as matters of party administration may now have consequences for a party’s participation in an election where the Electoral Act expressly attaches legal consequences to non-compliance.
The decision is consequently significant beyond the immediate dispute between INEC and the Zenith Labor Party. It reinforces the principle that political parties, while constitutionally recognized and entitled to internal organization, must comply with valid legislation governing their participation in Nigeria’s electoral process.
The 2027 elections will ultimately provide the practical setting in which the restored provisions are tested. Whether they reduce disputes over party primaries and candidate nomination, or instead produce new litigation over compliance, will depend substantially on how political parties, aspirants and INEC implement and interpret the statutory requirements.
RECOMMENDATION
- The National Assembly should clarify provisions dealing with membership registers, particularly the consequences of errors, late submissions, amendments and disputes concerning membership.
- The law should provide a transparent procedure through which parties can correct genuine errors without compromising the integrity of the register.
- Before a party suffers the severe consequence of being unable to field a candidate under section 77(7), there should be clear notice and an opportunity to address genuine compliance issues where appropriate.
- The law should provide greater clarity on the practical operation of direct primaries and consensus, particularly regarding documentation, transparency and disputes.
- INEC should publish clear compliance guidelines. Parties should know precisely what documents they must submit, applicable deadlines and the consequences of non-compliance.
- Parties should maintain accurate membership records and documentary evidence of their internal processes so that disputes can be resolved on reliable evidence.
- Judicial interpretation should remain anchored in constitutional supremacy. Future courts should continue to distinguish between legitimate electoral regulation and legislation that genuinely conflicts with constitutional provisions.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court’s decision confirms that political-party autonomy does not place parties beyond legitimate electoral regulation. However, the National Assembly’s power is not unlimited; every electoral law remains subject to the supremacy of the Constitution.
As Nigeria approaches the 2027 elections, political parties and INEC must ensure strict compliance with the restored provisions, while the legislature should address any practical uncertainties in their implementation.
Ultimately, the case reinforces a fundamental constitutional principle: electoral regulation must operate within the boundaries of constitutional supremacy.
REFERENCES
Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999
Electoral Act 2026.
Independent National Electoral Commission v Zenith Labour Party SC/CR/495/2026 (Supreme Court, 24 September 2026).
Zenith Labour Party v Independent National Electoral Commission CA/ABJ/CV/750/2026 (Court of Appeal, 16 July 2026).
Zenith Labour Party v Independent National Electoral Commission FHC/ABJ/509/2026 (Federal High Court, 5 May 2026).
Ndidiamaka Ede, ‘Supreme Court restores Electoral Act provisions voided by appeal court’ Premium Times (25 September 2026) available at https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/top-news/912319-supreme-court-restores-electoral-act-provisions-voided-by-appeal-court.html?; accessed 27 September 2026.
Ikechukwu Nnochiri, ‘2027 Polls: S’Court allows INEC’s appeal, restores voided portions of Electoral Act’ Vanguard (24 September 2026) available at https://www.vanguardngr.com/2026/09/2027-polls-scourt-allows-inecs-appeal-restores-voided-portions-of-electoral-act/amp/?; accessed 27 September 2026.
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Appeal Court voids key Electoral Act provisions on parties’ primary election, membership register’ Premium Times (17 July 2026) available at https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/top-news/896056-appeal-court-voids-key-electoral-act-provisions-on-parties-primary-election-membership-register.html?; accessed 27 September 2026.
Dare Akogun, Olufemi Adediran, Yusuf Oketola, Chima Azubuike and Bola Bamigbamidele, ‘Fresh court battles brew over primaries’ Punch (27 September 2026) available at https://punchng.com/fresh-court-battles-brew-over-primaries/?; accessed 27 September 2026.
Unini Chioma, ‘Political Parties Must Comply With Membership Register, Nomination Requirements — Supreme Court Reverses Court Of Appeal Judgment Ahead Of 2027’ The Nigerian Lawyer (24 September 2026) available at https://thenigerialawyer.com/political-parties-must-comply-with-membership-register-nomination-requirements-supreme-court-reverses-court-of-appeal-judgment-ahead-of-2027/?; accessed 27 September 2026.
Author:
Oluwaleye Adedoyin Grace, LLB. (Hons.)
[email protected] or 0810628906