INTRODUCTION
I have watched with keen interest the media analysis of several legal practitioners who contend that Hon. O.K. Chinda —the All Progressives Congress (APC) gubernatorial candidate for Rivers State—will be caught in the web of the Supreme Court’s judgment in INEC v. Zenith Labour Party (ZLP). Their argument relies on the premise that because his defection to the APC was only formally announced on the floor of the House of Representatives in June, his nomination is automatically invalidated under the restored membership register requirements of Section 77 of the Electoral Act 2026.
I beg to differ.
The candidateship of O.K. Chinda was officially announced on May 21, 2026, following the APC primary election in Rivers State. From all verifiable facts, no aggrieved aspirant or interested party challenged his nomination within the strict constitutional limit of 14 days. Therefore, his nomination remains valid, subsisting, and legally unassailable.
This brings us to the next critical question: Can the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) disqualify him unilaterally on the strength of the ZLP judgment?
The answer is an unequivocal no. Below is an analysis of why neither the Supreme Court’s verdict nor INEC’s administrative powers can retroactively extinguish O.K. Chinda’s candidacy.
The Scope of INEC v. ZLP
The recent decision of the Supreme Court in INEC v. Zenith Labour Party (SC/CR/495/2026) set aside the Court of Appeal’s judgment and restored the legal validity of Sections 77(5)–(7) and 84(2) of the Electoral Act 2026. These provisions require political parties to maintain and submit their membership registers to INEC within statutory deadlines and restrict nomination modes to direct primaries or consensus.
However, many legal commentators conflate two distinct legal principles: the validity of a statutory provision and the validity of an individual candidate’s nomination.
By upholding Section 77, the Supreme Court declared that the law requiring a candidate to be on the party’s submitted membership register is constitutional. The court did not (Emphasis) make a blanket, factual determination that O.K. Chinda was absent from the APC register submitted to INEC.
Resolving whether an individual’s name was on a register or whether their defection was validly recorded in party books before the primary is a question of fact that requires evidence, pleadings, and a trial. The apex court’s judgment was an in rem constitutional validation of the statute, not an in personam disqualification order against candidates across the country who were not parties to that suit.
Let us now move to the Section 285(9) and the 14-Day Limitation Period
To challenge O.K. Chinda’s candidacy based on Section 77 or Section 84 of the Electoral Act 2026, an aggrieved party was required to institute a pre-election suit at the Federal High Court.
Under Section 285(9) of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (as amended), every pre-election matter must be filed within 14 days from the date of the occurrence of the event, decision, or action complained of.
If the grievance is that O.K. Chinda was not eligible to participate in the May 21, 2026 primary election because he was not in the APC membership register, the cause of action accrued on or before May 21, 2026. That 14-day constitutional window closed in early June 2026.
Because no aspirant filed an action within that mandatory 14-day period, any fresh or contemplated suit challenging his nomination is statute-barred. The Supreme Court’s judgment in ZLP cannot retroactively revive a dead cause of action or create a fresh 14-day window to challenge an event that occurred months prior. Jurisdiction is the lifeblood of adjudication; without a timely filed suit, no court in Nigeria has the jurisdiction to touch O.K. Chinda’s nomination.
This bring us to a more important question. Can INEC Unilaterally Disqualify O.K. Chinda?
Some analysts speculate that INEC, relying on the restored provisions of Section 77, can independently remove O.K. Chinda’s name from the published list of candidates. This notion flies in the face of both express statutory provisions and settled electoral jurisprudence.
Firstly, statutory Provisions Reserve Disqualification to the Courts. Thus, for instance, Section 29(6) of the Electoral Act 2026 provides that where an aspirant successfully proves that a candidate supplied false information, it is “the Court” that shall issue an order disqualifying the candidate.
Additionally, section 88(3) of the Electoral Act 2026 explicitly states:
Where a court finds that the political party failed to comply with the provisions of this Act… its candidate shall not be included in the election.
The statutory provisions deliberately uses the phrase “Where a court finds” rather than “Where INEC determines.” INEC is an administrative body, not a court of law; it possesses no judicial powers to determine non-compliance or execute disqualifications on its own motion.
Secondly is the popular doctrine established by the apex court in Dingyadi & Anor v. INEC & 2 Ors (No. 2) (2011) 18 NWLR (Pt. 1224) 154, Supreme Court in held that INEC lacks the power to disqualify any candidate on its own after their name has been submitted by a political party.
Thirdly, under Section 33 of the Electoral Act 2026, once a candidate’s name has been submitted to INEC under Section 29, the political party cannot change or substitute that candidate except in the specific event of “death or voluntary withdrawal.” INEC cannot invent an administrative power of substitution or removal outside these explicit statutory exceptions.
Finally, removing or disqualifying O.K. Chinda without a formal judicial process where he is named as a party would represent a gross violation of his fundamental right to a fair hearing under Section 36(1) of the 1999 Constitution.
A candidate cannot be deprived of an accrued legal right—such as a valid nomination—by administrative fiat or through a court judgment to which he was never a party. He must be given the opportunity to present his defense, tender his APC registration documentation, and cross-examine adverse claims.
Therefore, the public discourse surrounding the Supreme Court’s ruling in INEC v. Zenith Labour Party has been driven largely by political sentiment rather than strict legal interpretation.
1. The Supreme Court validated a law; it did not disqualify O.K. Chinda.
2. No challenge was brought against his May 21, 2026 primary within the 14-day limit imposed by Section 285(9) of the Constitution, making his nomination unassailable.
3. INEC lacks the statutory and constitutional authority to unilaterally administrative-strike or disqualify any candidate from the ballot.
O.K. Chinda’s candidacy remains valid, subsisting, and protected under Nigerian electoral law.
Author:
Ahmad Abubakar is Legal Practitioner, Researcher and Analyst. He writes from Abuja, Nigeria.